


Strategy Research Project

EU Civil-Military Cell: Useful Model for Joint/Interagency Operations?

by

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United States Army War College
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon has transformed European Security and Defense policy to a Common Security and Defense Policy for member states. As part of CSDP, the EU Civil-Military operations have been consolidated in the European External Action Service as the Crisis Management Planning Directorate. EU Civil-Military operations can inform the US Joint/Interagency Model particularly in the area of creating a permanent planning directorate jointly manned by military and civilian staff. EU structures and the EU management of the "Comprehensive Approach" make the model difficult to apply in the Joint/Interagency environment.

EU CIVIL-MILITARY CELL: USEFUL MODEL FOR JOINT/INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS?

The United States has achieved remarkable military victories in the last 20 years. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the toppling of the Taliban regime in 2001 demonstrated the US military's unparalleled ability to defeat adversaries in conventional engagements. Failures in stability operations in Somalia and in post-Saddam Iraq however demonstrate that military success does not always equate to strategic success. While a flawed policy in itself or a failure to execute policy appropriately may be to blame in some instances, the failure to plan for and integrate the national elements of power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – in a coherent and synergistic way has no doubt contributed to the United States inability to achieve unity of effort across government agencies and increase the chance of converting military into strategic success. The current US National Security Strategy has identified this imbalance as a problem and calls for more balance across the whole of the US government so the military does not absorb a disproportionate share of the burden in these types of missions.¹ Stability operations very often demand an interdependent military-civilian effort or comprehensive approach throughout all stages from inception to planning to execution.

This paper will compare the organizations and processes employed at the strategic level by the United States and the European Union for the planning of civil-military operations and provide recommendations from the EU experience that can be applied to the US interagency process. The United States government has relied on an interagency approach to develop the policies and inform the strategies used in civil-

military operations. Operations over the last twenty years have exposed deficiencies, specifically the lack of a synchronized, coordinated effort in the planning and execution of these operations. As a multi-national institution created to harmonize and integrate European states after the horrors of two world wars, the EU throughout its history has taken an incremental approach in integrating its member-states and creating supranational structures and institutions with the power to speak for and act in the interests of the member states. In many spheres this has led to an ad hoc approach that once used and proven effective is then codified into existing EU policies. The EU has approached security and defense in much this same manner since the inception of European Security and Defense Policy. An ad hoc approach toward both the planning and execution of operations has been a hallmark of EU civilian missions and military operations since 2003. This can be expected given the nature of the EU itself. In general, any agreement on a way forward requires consensus from the member states. Exacerbating difficulties to achieving consensus in security and defense matters, 21 states are members of both the EU and NATO and there are strong differences of opinion as to whether the EU is working in competition or in complementarity with NATO.

With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has transformed what was European Security and Defense Policy to a Common Security and Defense Policy for member states. The changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty in this arena include the creation of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the subsequent move of the EU Military Staff's civil-military staff to the CMPD – a change which has the potential to unify civil-military planning under one joint military and civilian

planning staff from the very conception of a CSDP military operation or civilian mission. The idea of creating a Brussels-based EU operations center to serve as both a planning and operations center, which has only been discussed and whose realization is uncertain, would allow the EU to attain unity of effort in civil-military operations. These two ideas, the first in the process of implementation and the second under discussion, present two ideas that might inform future US government restructuring options in the area of civil-military planning at the national level.

The bureaucracies and systems of the US government and European Union are different and not comparable in all aspects given their different organizing principles and structures. The USG interagency operates as part of a national, federal government. EU bureaucracies exist within a multinational, multilateral, intergovernmental institutional context. These realities lead to differences not only in the approaches to and conduct of civil-military planning. Even with respect to these differences, a comparison between the two is not only possible but also useful from a multi-level governance perspective. The US and the EU arguably share enough similarities to warrant a comparison of processes, systems, and structures. With ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU now has a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) for its member states.

Although one should not underestimate the scale and range of recent EU missions, many of which have been put together with remarkable speed and efficiency, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is capability, the EU has still not assumed a global role on the scale of the United States for interventions. The bulk of operations have been in Europe, particularly in the Western Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East.

The EU states on its own website, “. . . there is a growing demand for the European Union to become more capable, more coherent and more strategic as a global actor.”² It is therefore with this view of the EU as a global actor that comparison with the US is instructive.

Creation of European Union Security and Defense Structures

Some have argued that the EU’s institutional development in the sphere of security and defense policy has lagged behind operational requirements and the organizations and processes are far from ideal for planning civil-military operations.³

The Saint Malo summit meeting in 1998 between France and the United Kingdom created European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). It also created the tension between those member states such as France that saw ESDP as a challenge to NATO’s primacy in European security and those such as the UK that it saw it as complementary to NATO efforts.

In 1999 the Helsinki European Council established three new political and military bodies within the European Council: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC) comprised of the Chiefs of Defense of Member States, and the Military Staff (EUMS). All three are analogous with bodies in the NATO structure. The PSC provides political control and strategic direction for operations and sends guidelines to the EUMC. The EUMC then gives military advice and recommendations to the PSC. The EUMC directs the EUMS to produce strategic options and conduct operations.

The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty brought several structural changes greatly effecting CSDP. Implementation created the dual-hatted Vice-President of the Council and High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs and the High Representative’s

supporting organization the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS includes three organizations under the control of the High Representative that play important roles in civil-military operations: the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate, and the EU Military Staff.

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) became operational in 2008 and is the permanent structure responsible for the autonomous operational conduct of civilian CSDP operations. It has a mandate to plan and conduct civilian CSDP operations under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee; to provide assistance and advice to the High Representative, the Presidency and the relevant EU Council bodies and to direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review civilian CSDP operations.⁴ The CPCC therefore ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian CSDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks. The CPCC Director, as EU Civilian Operations Commander, exercises command and control at the strategic level for the planning and conduct of all civilian crisis management operations, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the overall authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security.⁵ The CPCC currently supervises and supports eight civilian CSDP missions: EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EU Police Mission and EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah in the Palestinian Territories, EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission Iraq, EU Rule of Law Mission Afghanistan and EU Rule of Law Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) provides military expertise and advice for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and performs early warning, strategic planning, and situation assessment. In addition to the five military operations undertaken and completed since 2003, the EUMS is currently directing three military operations: EU Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta, EU Training Mission Somalia, and EU Force Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina.

In 2003, the EUMS added a civil-military cell to its structure that was supposed to bring military and civilian planners and European Commission officials together. Working through the civil-military cell, the EUMS would be responsible for providing the capacity needed to plan and manage independent EU military operations. This would enable the EUMS to set up an operations center quickly when a civilian-military response was required and the Council did not designate a national headquarters to run the operation. The civil-military cell was organized into a strategic planning branch and an operations center permanent staff. The strategic planning staff, organized to conduct contingency planning, was to be staffed by 17 personnel: eight military and seven civilian planners, along with two planners from the European Commission. The operations center permanent staff is responsible for generating and maintaining the capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU operation particularly in the case of a joint civilian-military operation. The staff would also serve as the nucleus of the EU operations center once the Council makes the decision to activate the ops center.

While the EU created the civil-military cell to coordinate civil and military means and serve as the focal point to achieve coherence in planning for joint missions, several criticisms have been leveled about its effectiveness. Specifically, the military bias of the

organization, since it was physically located in the EUMS, hindered the organizations ability to effectively plan civil-military missions.⁶ Its physical location caused it to operate in isolation from the core civilian staff in the Council Secretariat.⁷ Ultimately, the civil-military cell really did nothing to unify the civilian and military aspects of ESDP and it proved incapable of providing effective support for civilian crisis management control.⁸

Whereas the EUMS civil-military cell demonstrated challenges, the CPCC showed an initial ability to conduct EU civilian missions and provided an important step towards enhancing civil-military coordination. The Lisbon Treaty, in 2008, combined Directorate General VIII (Military Aspects) with Directorate General IX (Civilian Aspects) into one single directorate, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), further integrating civil-military coordination. The CMPD provided a civilian counterpart to the EU military chain of command. The mandate of the CMPD is to “*inter alia* foster and coordinate work on synergies between civilian and military capability development, including in identifying dual needs.”⁹ To this end, the civil-military cell of the EUMS was moved to the CMPD in January 2011 with the head of the civil-military cell, a one-star military officer becoming the deputy to the civilian director of the CMPD.

The restructuring and fusion of these two directorates into the CMPD indicate the EU’s attempt to increase the cost-effectiveness of its approach to undertaking civil-military operations and avoid possible duplication with NATO. The EU sees itself as the multilateral organization best situated to use a “comprehensive approach” to crisis management and operations. A “comprehensive approach” requires the effective application of both military and civilian means to solve security problems. The EU has a range of political, economic but also security instruments at its disposal to respond to

international crisis situations. The Council can provide the security instruments in the form of military forces while the Commission can contribute its funding for humanitarian crises and a range of civilian experts in various areas for civil-military operations. The EU argues the “comprehensive approach” is an effective means to bring together both soft and hard power instruments and achieve unity of effort in operations to bring them to a successful conclusion.

For those that view the EU as being complementary to NATO, then it is in the application of the “comprehensive approach” that this is most evident. The EU advertises that it not only has military and political means, but most importantly, economic means NATO does not possess. It is in the addition of the EU's economic and non-military security means, specifically civilian rule of law trainers and its application of “soft power”, that it provides significant value-added compared to NATO and complements NATO's purely security-focused missions.

The CMPD is a significant step that has the potential to unify strategic planning within a single organization. The creation of the CMPD is a break with the EU's past history in creating impromptu organizations and processes that are partially effective and then institutionalizing them after the fact. It moves the EU away from the ad hoc, haphazard manner it has conducted civil-military planning in the past.

The CMPD is criticized for the possible “militarization” of civil-military planning. Much like the US and other countries, an experience gap exists between EU civilian and military planners. The EU lacks civilian strategic planners and will need to “grow” them for the future.¹⁰ Until experienced civilian planners arrive at the CMPD, military planners from the former EUMS civilian-military cell could come to dominate the strategic

planning process in the CMPD. The risk is that a military-dominated planning cell would develop a civilian-military plan without taking the civilian aspects of an operation into account therefore diluting the comprehensive approach on which the EU prides itself.

EU Operational Headquarters Options

In the event of a crisis, the CMPD with the support of the EUMS drafts the initial planning documents describing the political objectives, desired end-state, constraints, and required capabilities for an operation.¹¹ An operational headquarters then drafts the operational plan. The EU currently has three options for planning and conducting EU crisis management operations.

The first option uses NATO capabilities and common assets under the so-called “Berlin plus” arrangements, to make use of command and control options such as the Operation Headquarters located at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium with D-SACEUR as the Operational Commander. This is the option used in the conduct of Operation ALTHEA, where EUFOR BiH operates in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For this option to be viable, NATO capabilities and assets must not be engaged elsewhere and thus available for EU use. Approval of NATO assets for EU use must come from the North Atlantic Council, thereby running the risk of a possible veto. Coordinating and synchronizing EU civil-military assets in this case is difficult.

The second option is to rely on a framework nation and use facilities provided by one of the five Operation Headquarters (OHQs) currently available in European Member States. These are: the French OHQ in Mont Valérien, Paris; the UK OHQ in Northwood; the German OHQ in Potsdam, Berlin; the Italian OHQ in Rome; and the Greek OHQ in Larissa. In 2003, Operation ARTEMIS in the DR Congo used the French OHQ, while

the current EUFOR DR Congo military operation employs the German OHQ. In this option, the national staffs may not have the requisite capabilities to plan or synchronize civil-military operations.

The third option is to utilize the EU operations center within the EUMS in Brussels for crisis management missions of up to 2000 soldiers. As it is currently organized, the operations center is not a standing headquarters, as are the five Operational Headquarters. The operations center has a permanent staff of five personnel and relies on a small core of the EUMS, as well as additional dual-hatted EUMS officers and augmentees from the Member States to round out the staff for operations and planning. The EUMS is tasked to achieve Initial Operating Capability of the Operations Center in order to plan a mission within 5 days and Full Operating Capability to run an operation within 20 days. Since it is not a standing headquarters, the time lag between the council decision to conduct an operation and the activation of the operations center would be detrimental to the planning and conduct of a fast-moving crisis. The capability of the operations center to manage a small size mission of up to 2000 soldiers does not necessarily follow from the EU's ambition to be a global player in the sphere of security and defense.

These three options all pose unique problems in the planning and conduct of civil-military operations. Despite the lack of political agreement among member states on the need to establish a permanent operational planning capability, various analysts over the past few years have argued for the EU to create a permanent structure to plan and conduct civil-military operations.¹² While the integration of the EUMS civil-military cell into the CMPD is a start, some have argued for a full-time civilian-military planning

structure within the CMPD that would form the backbone of an operational headquarters and provide the EU greater coherence and consistency in civilian and military planning.¹³ A permanent operational headquarters located in Brussels where all of the relevant EU actors are brought into the planning from the beginning would only strengthen the EU's ability to use its self-proclaimed advantage as a natural actor in combining civilian and military capabilities in the form of the "comprehensive approach." The operations center would therefore need to be restructured to bring together relevant elements from the CPCC and CMPD. This fully operational headquarters would allow planning concurrently with political debate over the question of undertaking an operation as well permanently ongoing contingency planning so once a political decision is taken the operational headquarters can be activated on the basis of a contingency plan.¹⁴ It would also be able to control an operation from the start of planning through its execution without transferring control to NATO, the UN, or a national HQ as currently happens.¹⁵

US Interagency Civil-Military Planning

The US government has struggled since the Cold War to develop an effective whole of government approach to successfully undertake increasingly more frequent and complex stability operations. Secretary Gates underscored this point in 2010 saying,

Last year, I sent Secretary Clinton one proposal I see as a starting point of discussion for the way ahead. It would involve pooled funds set up for security capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention. Both the State and Defense Departments would contribute to these funds, and no project could move forward without the approval of both agencies. What I found compelling about this approach is that it would actually incentivize collaboration between different agencies of our government, unlike the existing structure and processes left over from the Cold War, which often conspire to hinder true whole-of-government approaches.¹⁶

From a security and defense standpoint, during the Cold War, the United States Government was tailored specifically to handle the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The various government agencies had well-defined roles and with the increased militarization of US foreign policy, the creation of the Combatant Commands, and increased share of the budget allocated for defense, the Department of Defense achieved primacy over the Department of State. During the 1990s, the United States became involved in various post-war stability operations in locations such as the Haiti, Somalia, and the Former Yugoslavia. Instead of a comprehensive structured approach, the United States instead approached each crisis on an ad hoc basis with the Department of Defense, the agency most capable of responding quickly, taking the lead and other civilian departments and agencies having a minor role. The United States has a difficult time achieving unity of effort or a whole of government approach to stability operations. There are several reasons for this problem. The United States government lacks the established procedures for planning and conducting interagency operations. The United States government has no mechanism to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of the different agencies. Finally, civilian agencies, unlike the military, do not have the capacity to rapidly deploy their personnel.

While the institutional structures may exist for interagency planning, unlike the military, the US government really does not have established procedures for planning and conducting interagency operations. Each presidential administration takes it upon itself to determine how the national security apparatus will plan, organize, and conduct operations. This has led to the current ad hoc nature of planning for contingency

operations. The transition from the Clinton to the Bush administrations demonstrates this occurrence.

In 1997, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 to improve the unity of effort for nation-building and humanitarian missions. PDD 56 recognized that “military forces can quickly affect the dynamics of a situation and create the conditions necessary to make significant progress in mitigating or resolving underlying conflict or dispute . . . many aspects of complex emergencies may not be best addressed through military measures.”¹⁷ It recognized the need to incorporate proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms into the interagency process on a regular basis.¹⁸ Essentially, this was an attempt to establish a structured interagency planning approach at the national level to bring all of the relevant USG departments and agencies together. PDD-56 was effectively discarded by the Bush administration until the situation in post-war Iraq deteriorated precipitously in 2004. President Bush in 2005 signed National Security Presidential Directive 44. The Secretary of State was given the responsibility to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”¹⁹ The State Department’s Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) would serve as the focal point for the Department of State’s efforts to harmonize planning across the interagency. NSPD-44 directed the Secretaries of State and Defense to integrate stabilization and reconstruction plans with military contingency plans. The directive also established a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations within the National Security

Council. S/CRS, in January 2007 drafted the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization. It was approved by the National Security Council and was to serve as the mechanism for interagency cooperation in complex reconstruction and stabilization crises. S/CRS was tasked with providing support to a civilian planning cell integrated with a geographic combatant command or multinational headquarters. The Obama Administration, in November 2011, announced the creation of the new State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations that integrated the S/CRS. Its mission was to provide the institutional focus for policy and “operational solutions” to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states.

While attempts have been made over the last several years to provide a whole of government approach, a solution is still lacking. The onus for civil-military operations will continue to remain with the military until the US government invests in the non-military institutions that used to carry out stabilization, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency missions. That includes the State Department, the US Agency for International Development, and the US Information Agency, all of which played major roles in counterinsurgencies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s until they were downsized or became casualties of the post-Cold War peace dividend. Until they receive proper funding and staffing, a whole of government approach cannot be implemented.

Secretary Gates argued that the United States should pool certain funding for DOS and DOD to better manage projects in combat zones. He proposed a two billion dollar shared fund for security capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention. The Obama administration in December 2011, proposed a fifty million dollar Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to respond to “urgent and emergent challenges.”²⁰

Both the Secretaries of State and Defense would have to approve the use of these funds. The GSCF office, located at Foggy Bottom, will have a director from the State Department and a deputy director from the Defense Department. Funding for the project requested by the President was omitted from the budget bill passed by Congress however the administration was given the authority to start the project by moving funds from other accounts.

The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), a 12 person directorate, at the Geographic Combatant Commands were created to facilitate information sharing throughout the interagency, provides a civilian perspective on the planning and execution of operations, and integrates campaign planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels.²¹ The JIACG serves as a coordinating body among the civilian agencies in Washington, D.C., US ambassadors, and the combatant commander's staff.²² As outlined in the Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, the JIACG is described as a fully integrated participant on the combatant commander's staff. It focuses on joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning²³. They are emerging as collaborative-enabled, multi-disciplined teams that support military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities as well as crisis response and limited contingency operations to major operations²⁴. While the JIACG provides a means for the combatant commander to integrate civilian aspects to military planning, it does not address the need at the national level for an integrated civilian-military approach to strategic planning.

Conclusion

The United States and the European Union face many of the same underlying problems in civil-military planning at the strategic level. While the European Union now has a structure in the form of the CMPD that can serve as the focal point for synchronized civilian-military planning efforts, the United States still appears to be taking a piecemeal approach. With the addition of the EUMS civil-military cell, the CMPD has the potential to integrate planning at the strategic level but it must still make improvements to become truly effective. The EU needs to create a cadre of qualified, experienced planners. While this is not a task that can be accomplished in a short time, it is nonetheless essential. The EU must either create EU-level programs to train its civilian cadre, or leverage the existing military education systems within the various member states to accept civilian students to learn military planning procedure. At the very least, the latter option provides civilian staff with an understanding of how their military counterparts approach operations.

Until the United States can achieve some form of structural integration at the national level, it will continue to see difficulties in achieving an effective whole of government approach for civil-military operations. The EU was able to structurally bring together its military and civilian planners. In the case of the US government this is an arduous task as large bureaucracies are involved. The National Security Council provides a framework for strategic planning but it has not been able to effectively bring together civilian and military planning staffs together. Liaisons exist throughout the USG, with military officers at the Department of State, Foreign Service officers at the Defense Department, and USAID officers at the Geographic Combatant Commands. While liaisons can ensure that their parent organizations are kept abreast of the

activities of their host organizations, their presence does not necessarily ensure that either their parent or host organizations create coordinated, synchronized plans.

The United States government should create an organization akin to the CMPD that integrates strategic level civil-military planning. Several options exist for creating this type of organization. The recently created GCSF may be a first step in this direction. While it seems that the purpose for its creation was to serve as a clearinghouse for shared funds to be used by both DOS and DOD, the GCSF could provide the backbone for an integrated group of civilian and military planners. The GCSF office is already slated to have officials from both departments in its top two posts. A permanent core of military and civilian planners from both departments could then be assigned. The office could then serve as a civil-military planning staff for the National Security Council as it deliberates on policy options as part of the interagency process. The GCSF could also serve as a point of contact for the JIACGs located at the Geographic Combatant Commands assuring coherency of planning at the strategic and operational levels.

The second option is to create a civil-military planning cell under the Deputy National Security Advisor as part of the existing National Security Staff (NSS) structure. This cell would give the NSS an immediate interagency planning capability at the national level to provide the broad outlines for civil-military operational planning. Either option poses challenges. The US will have to develop and use training programs to overcome the experience gap between civilian and military planners. Proposals have been made to transform the National Defense University into a National Security University, which would train a professional civilian policy corps thereby providing the national security apparatus with a trained civilian cadre to complement their military

counterparts. Departments and agencies will have to make assignments to any national civilian-military planning cell career enhancing or else the best and most qualified applicants will not seek out positions. Much as Goldwater-Nichols enshrined “jointness” as a prerequisite for senior officer promotions, something akin should be established to make “interagencyness” career enhancing in the same way. Finally, overcoming institutional bureaucracy is essential in making any kind of progress. The GSCF may be an effective test bed because it has received funding. If Congress funds an initiative and continues to fund it then the various departments and agencies have an incentive to participate. Additionally, if Congress deems interagency collaboration is important and proscribes it into law in the manner of Goldwater-Nichols then it provides an equally important incentive for individual departments to take it seriously.

At the turn of this century, the Bush administration entered office with a view that the US did not conduct nation-building operations. Events in Afghanistan and Iraq forced the US into long-term stability operations in both countries. Despite the end of the Iraq War and the winding down of the war in Afghanistan, stability operations are not likely to decrease in the future. The importance of using a whole of government approach to solve these problems has been made painfully evident over the past 10 years. The issue is whether the US can move past the planning approach bequeathed from its Cold War government institutions and build a whole of government approach into operations from their very initiation. The EU is making an attempt and at least provides an example if not the solution.

Endnotes

¹ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 14.

² *European Union Civilian and Military Capability Development Page*, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/capabilities/eu-civilian-and-military-capability-development?lang=en> (accessed January 20, 2012).

³ Carmen Gebhard, "The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct Capacities", *CFSP Forum* 7, no. 4 (July, 2009): 9.

⁴ *European Union Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Home Page*, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/cpcc?lang=en> (accessed January 20, 2012).

⁵ Ibid.

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